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Abstract: Generally, Plato is seen as a monist philosopher. But this fact is 
true only if we take in account his written works. Since the Tübingen School 
reveals the importance of Plato’s inner-Academic teachings, the Plato 
monism is questionable. In this paper we try to find out if Plato is a dualist. 
We will see that, according to his successors, Plato spoke about two first 
supreme principles: the One and the indefinite Dyad. Moreover, some 
Modern scholars have proved that those teachings aren’t contradictory to 
Plato’s dialogues. In that case, the answer to our question will be positive.  
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PLATO’S UNWRITTEN TEACHINGS AND THE TÜBINGEN 
SCHOOL  
There are different interpretations of Plato’s philosophy, but since the 
50’s of the last century Tübingen School of interpretation began to 
impose
1. This kind of interpretation starts with the works of Hans 
Joachim Krämer and Konrad Gaiser, along with the researches of 
scholars like Heinz Happ, Thomas A. Szlezák, Vittorio Hösle, Jürgen 
Wippern, and Jens Halfwassen, or Giovanni Reale. Another kind of 
scholars who are affiliated to the Tübingen School of interpretation, 
but a little bit different then it is that represented by W. K. C. Guthrie, 
J. N. Findlay, Julia Annas or John Dillon.  
The most famous adversary of the idea that Plato had unwritten 
teachings is Harold Fredrik Cherniss. His opinion is that Aristotle had 
merely misunderstood the Platonic dialogues. The main arguments in 
favor of Plato’s oral teachings are: the criticism of writing in the 
Phaedrus, indirect tradition that speaks about theories that cannot be 
found in Plato’s dialogues, the dialogues make reference beyond text, 
the Seventh Letter attests Plato’s esoteric doctrine, also Aristotle attests 
Plato’s Unwritten doctrines (agrapha dogmata).   
                                                           
 Department of Philosophy, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iași - 700506, 
Romania  
e-mail: pricopi@gmail.com  
1 About how Plato should be read in the light of his unwritten teachings, see Thomas 
A. Szlezák (1999). Reading Plato. Translated by Graham Zanker, London/New 
York:.Routledge.   
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In his oral teachings, Plato develops a theory of first principles, 
which are the One and the indefinite Dyad. We have a testimony about 
this teaching from Aristotle, in his Metaphysics A. 6: “Since the Forms 
are the causes of all other things, he thought their elements were the 
elements of all things. As matter, the great and the small were 
principles; as essential reality, the One; for from the great and the 
small, by participation in the One, come the Forms.”
2 These two first 
principles are not subordinated to one another; they coexist, and play a 
different role in the constitution of the realm.  
According to Tübingen School, the main beliefs of Plato’s oral 
teachings are the following
3: 
1.  There are two primary ontological principles that are the 
causes of all things. 
2.  From these two first principles comes a hierarchy of being: 
Ideas and ideal numbers.  
3.  From the ideal numbers come geometrical entities. 
4.  After the intermediates come physical appearances. 
It appears to be clearly that Plato in his later years had become 
more attracted by the philosophical teachings of Pythagoreanism, 
which postulate a mathematical paradigm for the universe. Plato 
developed a philosophical system which implicated a pair of two 
opposed first principles, and division of being on three levels.
4 The 
first principles seem contrary one another, even if the One is unique 
and pure simplicity, it is still opposed to the Dyad. All other things can 
be deduced from the principles as their causes, but the principles 
themselves are not derived from each other.  
 
DIVISION OF BEING IN PLATO’S PHILOSOPHY  
About the division of being in Plato’s philosophy, we can find a useful 
discussion in the study of Giovanni Reale dedicated to Plato’s thought. 
The Italian scholar highlights the role of the hierarchical structure of 
realm; for Plato, the supreme principles of the One and the Dyad are 
followed by the level of Forms or Ideas, then they are followed by 
mathematical entities and in the end, by the level of sensible world. 
                                                           
2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987b. 
3 Dmitri Nikulin, “Plato: Testimonia et Fragmenta”, in Dmitri Nikulin (ed.) (2012). 
The Other Plato: The Tübingen Interpretation of Plato's Inner-Academic Teachings, 
New York: State University of New York Press, pp.15-17.  
4 John Dillon (2003). The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 
B.C.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.17-18.   
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Each of these levels is further subdivided into: ideal Numbers and 
Figures which are followed by general Forms and then by more 
specific and particular Ideas. After this level is the level of geometrical 
entities, sphere and solid, objects of pure astronomy and objects of 
musicology. The last level includes all sensible realities.
5 Between the 
levels exists a unilateral non-symmetrical ontological dependence, in 
other words the lower levels are dependent of higher levels, but those 
higher levels can be without the lower.
6  
Other scholar tells us that for Plato reality is set along two axes, 
one horizontal and one vertical. The horizontal axis is formed by the 
One and the Dyad. This vertical axis refers to the hierarchy of 
ontological levels, in such a way that the two principles interact on 
each level to produce the various levels of reality.
7 
The dyadic principle is responsible for the development of the 
levels of reality by being a source of tension and differentiation on the 
lower levels. The One is the principle of sameness, whereas the 
indefinite Dyad is the principle of difference. Each successive level of 
reality generated by the One and the Dyad is characterized by a further 
distancing from the supreme principles and a continuous increase of 
dyadic qualities. Turner stresses that the Dyad ends up at the bottom of 
these levels of reality as the ultimate receptacle and substrate of all 
particulars.
8 
On the other hand, the physical world is intermediate between an 
eternal and perfect being, which is unchangeable, and not-being. This 
fact is found in Republic where the physical world is intermediate 
between pure being and pure non-being. Here are two passages from 
the dialogue: “Hence, as it seems, it would remain for us to find what 
participates in both-in to be and not to be-and could not correctly be 
addressed as either purely and simply, so that, if it comes to light, we 
can justly address it as the opinable, thus assigning the extremes to the 
extremes and that which is in between to that which is in between”
9; 
“Then we have found, as it seems, that the many beliefs of the many 
                                                           
5 Giovanni  Reale ( 1988).  Storia della filosofia antica: II. Platone e Aristotele, 
Milano: Vita e Pensiero, pp.152-153.  
6 Ibidem, p.153.  
7 John D. Turner, “Introduction”, in Wolf-Peter Funk, Paul-Hubert Poirier, John D. 
Turner (2000), Marsanès: NH X, Peeters/Louvain/Paris: Les Presses De L’Université 
Laval, p.178.  
8 Ibidem.  
9 Plato, Republic, 478 e.   
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about what's fair and about the other things roll around somewhere 
between not-being and being purely and simply."
10 
Reale considers that the passages above speak about the dyadic 
principle. Non-being from this passages seems to be nothing, but the 
text enable us, declares Reale, to believe that “Plato meant rather, the 
opposite material principle (the sensible Dyad), that, as we know, 
become assimilated to non-being, since, for our philosopher, being is a 
"mixture," which depends on the determination and delimitation of the 
indeterminate and unlimited (and such is instead the Dyad of the great-
and-small that is exactly the unlimited)”.
11 Reale concludes that it is 
clear that the participation in non-being is possible, only if non-being 
is something. So, it clear that the physical world is situated between 
two entities, pure being and non-being, but the latter must be 
something else than nothing. I think that Reale’s conclusion must be 
connected with the affirmation made by Burnet in the first part of his 
book about Greek philosophy. The Scottish classicist believes that if 
someone reads the Sophist rightly, along the testimony of Hermodoros, 
he will come up with the conclusion that “it is not meant that the 
indefinite continuum of the more and less is nothing, but rather it is not 
anything”
12.  
 
IDEAS AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD  
For Plato, physical world, as we saw, is a mix between being and non-
being, whereas the Ideas are being in the pure sense; our world is 
corporeal, whereas the Ideas are incorporeal. In the same time the 
physical world is sensible, whereas the Forms are intelligible things; 
the Ideas are stable and eternal realities, they are absolute, whereas 
sensible realities are corruptible and relative. Because of this, many 
scholars saw in Plato’s philosophy a kind of dualism between physical 
world and Ideas. Anyway, Plato doesn’t talk about a world of Ideas, 
for the first time in history, Philo from Alexandria is the one who 
talked about kosmos noētós, which means the world of Ideas.  
Giovanni Reale reacts against the opinion that postulates a 
dualism between physical world and the eternal with its incorruptible 
Ideas, as A. H. Armstrong did. Here are the words of Reale about this 
topic: “if the Ideas are opposed to experiential things as the intelligible 
                                                           
10 Ibidem, 479 d.  
11 Giovanni Reale, op. cit., p.159, n.6.  
12   John Burnet (1928), Greek Philosophy. Part I, Thales to Plato, London: 
MacMillan and Co., p.330.   
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to the sensible, being to becoming, incorporeal to corporeal, immobile 
to mobile, absolute to relative, unity to multiplicity, then it is obvious 
that they represent a different measure of reality, a new and higher 
realm of being itself”
13. The Ideas transcend the sensible things, and 
this aspect allows them to be the cause of physical world. Against 
those who claim a dualism between two opposed worlds, Reale says 
that the dualism of Plato is nothing else than the dualism who admits 
the existence of a supreme cause as a reason of being of the physical 
world. We have to underline that the sensible, by its reason of self-
contradictory nature, cannot be its own reason of being.
14  
 
THE ONE AND THE INDEFINITE DYAD  
Nikulin says that the opposition between the two principles of the One 
and the Dyad is contradictory, because they do not allow for mediation 
or anything to mediate between these principles. This is another reason 
why first principles in Plato cannot be considered as embedded in, or 
embraced by, one single principle.
15 On the other hand, Giovanni 
Reale writes that it is more exact to say that the One and the indefinite 
Dyad have a bipolar structure, since the principles require each other 
structurally or necessarily.
16 
The Dyad is regarded, according to Plato’s inner-Academic 
teachings, as a sort of duality, as being infinitely extendible or 
divisible, being in the same time indefinitely large or indefinitely 
small. The influence of the Dyad can be observed all through the 
physical world, where the imposition of correct measure can limit the 
excess and defect. So, the Dyad has an ethical aspect, since the virtues 
must be seen as measures between excess and limit.
17About the One as 
principle of Good and the Dyad as principle of evil we can find 
something in the testimony of Aristotle
18. At this point we reach 
another issue. Plato writes in his Republic that the One is the Good, 
and it is the principle of everything. More than that “the Good isn’t 
being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power”
19.  
                                                           
13 Giovanni Reale, op.cit., pp.93-94.  
14 Ibidem, p.95.  
15 Dmitri Nikulin, op. cit., p.21.  
16 Giovanni Reale, op. cit., p.107.  
17 John Dillon, op. cit., p.18.  
18 Aristotle, Metaphisics, 988 a.  
19 Plato, Republic, 509 b.   
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Is this affirmation in contradiction with Plato’s unwritten 
teachings? Apparently not because the Good “is the cause of the things 
that are in a good way”
20, and we must find some other cause for the 
bad things.  Thomas A. Szlezák believes that here we can find an 
allusion to the dyadic principle.
21 In the same study, the German 
scholar considers that at a closer examination, there is not a real 
contradiction between the written theory from Republic and the 
unwritten teachings.  
 
THE INDEFINITE DYAD AS MATTER  
Another question resides in the cosmologic myth of dialogue Timaeus. 
Here we find a term, the receptacle (hypodoche), which is also called 
“Nurse of all creation”
22. Also, Plato uses   the term chora, which 
means place, space, in his discussion of the Receptacle in the Timaeus. 
However, Plato never used the term "matter" in the Timaeus. He, as 
Lesley Dean-Jones points out, speaks about the “particulars as coming 
to be in the particulars, not as being made out of it”
23, and maybe he 
used that terminology to avoid any similarity with the physical 
philosophers, who considered the elements as the source of physical 
world.
24 
 The one who equals the receptacle with matter was his disciple, 
Aristotle. Plato says, we find this in Aristotle’s testimony, that matter 
and space are the same thing. Also, Aristotle informs us that for Plato 
place and space were the same thing
25. Claghorn observes that the 
Plato’s receptacle seems to be very close to Aristotle’s prime matter
26, 
on the other hand, Cherniss believes that Aristotle misinterprets Plato’s 
vision about receptacle
27.  
                                                           
20 Ibidem, 379 b.  
21 Thomas Alexander Szlezák, “The Idea of the Good as Archē in Plato’s Republic”, 
in Dmitri Nikulin (ed.), op. cit., p.131.  
22 Plato, Timaeus, 49 a, 52 e.  
23   Lesley Dean-Jones, “Aristotle’s understanding of Plato’s Receptacle and Its 
Significance for Aristotle’s Theory of Familial Resemblance”, in M.R. Wright (ed.) 
(2000). Essays on Plato’s Timaeus, London: Duckworth, p.111, n. 9.  
24  George S. Claghorn (1954). Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Timaeus, Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, p.19.  
25 Aristotle, Physics, 209b.  
26 George S. Claghorn, op. cit., pp. 18-19.  
27 Harold Cherniss (1962). The Riddle of the Early Academy, New York: Russel & 
Russel, pp.16-17.   
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The proof that the receptacle is matter is in the gold analogy from 
fragment 50 a, where it is written that shapes are formed out of 
receptacle. The receptacle is also called in Timaeus: soft material, 
mother and nurse. We must note also that Aristotle says in his Physics 
that the platonic matter is non-being. But, we know that for Plato non-
being doesn’t mean that it is without existence and somehow that 
matter is.  Findlay, despite his attraction to Plato’s unwritten teachings 
sees in him a monist.
28 But receptacle of the Timaeus is the Dyad; it is 
the “feminine principle” which acts as a principle of multiplicity, 
otherness and limitedness.
29  
 
CONSENSUS IN DEFINING DUALISM  
Dualism has received some univocally definitions from scholars. 
Generally there is a consensus about what it means. In the The 
Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, the dualism is defined as 
follows: “Any metaphysical theory which, in contrast to monism, holds 
that reality is composed of two kinds of fundamental entities, neither 
of which can be reduced to the other.”
30 And in the same place we 
read: “In its wider sense, dualism refers to philosophical systems that 
are established on some sharp fundamental distinction, such as Plato’s 
distinction between the sensible world and ideal world or Kant’s 
distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world”. 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy defines dualism as: “the 
view that reality consists of two disparate parts. The crux of dualism is 
an apparently unbridgeable gap between two incommensurable orders 
of being that must be reconciled if our assumption that there is a 
comprehensible universe is to be justified. Dualism is exhibited in the 
pre-Socratic division between appearance and reality; Plato’s realm of 
being containing eternal Ideas and realm of becoming containing 
changing things (…)”.
31Arthur H. Armstrong proposes a typology of 
dualism which distinct between cosmic dualism and two-world 
dualism. The first one consider the whole existence as constituted by 
the interaction of two opposite principles, and the latter postulate a 
                                                           
28 John Niemeyer Findlay (2011). Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines, New 
York: Routledge, p.324.  
29 John D. Turner, op. cit. , p.181.  
30   Nicholas Bunnin, Jiyuan Yu ( 2004).  The Blackwell Dictionary of Western 
Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p.193.  
31 Robert Audi (ed.) (1999), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, 
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, p.244.   
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division between two levels of reality, the physical and the higher 
one.
32 
One of the most influential definitions is that given by the Italian 
scholar Ugo Bianchi. In his academic career, the problem of dualism 
occupies a special place.
33 As an overview of Bianchi’s conception 
about dualism we will use his article from Encyclopedia of Religion. 
Here dualism is seen “as a category within the history and 
phenomenology of religion, dualism may be defined as a doctrine that 
posits the existence of two fundamental causal principles underlying 
the existence”
34. In that article the authors propose a typology of 
dualism: radical versus moderate, dialectical versus eschatological, 
cosmic or procosmic versus anticosmic.  
Radical dualism admits two coequal and coeternal principles, in 
the sense that both of them exist and act from the very beginning; In 
dialectical dualism the two principles are often conceived of as good 
and evil, respectively, both in the ethical and metaphysical sense.
35 I 
disagree with some aspects of the typology proposed by Bianchi. For 
example, he says that there are two kind of dualism: radical and 
moderate. For him, Pythagoreans and Platonic traditions, which 
postulate the existence of one Supreme Being from whom a second 
principle somehow is derived, are dualistic systems, and I believe that 
this fact is not true. Moreover, Plotinus is a pure example of monism, 
or to use Gatti’s words he is an extreme radical monist
36.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Anyway, in respect to our paper, we must conclude from the 
definitions above that the dualism declares two first principles that are 
at the origin of the physical world. Here comes the question: is Plato a 
dualist? As we saw, the great philosopher can be seen sometimes as a 
                                                           
32 A.H. Armstrong (1992). “Dualism: Platonic, Gnostic and Christian”, in Richard T. 
Wallis (ed.). Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, New York: State University of New 
York Press, pp.33-54.  
33 The problem of dualism is widely debated in Ugo Bianchi (1978). Selected Essays 
on Gnosticism, Dualism and Mysteriography, Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp.3-62.  
34   Ugo Bianchi, Yuri Stoyanov (2005). “Dualism”, in Lindsay Jones (ed.). 
Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, Detroit/New York: Thomson Gale, 
p.2504.  
35Ibidem, pp. 2507-2508.  
36 Maria Luisa Gatti (1999). “Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the Foundation of 
Neoplatonism”, in Lloyd P. Gerson, The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus,  
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, p.24.   
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dualist, at least in his unwritten doctrines. Plato will be considered a 
monist if we pay attention only to his written works. But, as Tübingen 
School has proved there is no contradiction between his   inner-
Academic teachings and his dialogues.  
Moreover, as Dillon points out, the echo of these unwritten 
doctrines can be found in dialogues as the Republic, Timaeus, 
Philebus, and Laws, dialogues of the middle and later periods,  but 
these doctrines could not be detected in the dialogues alone.
37 But this 
fact doesn’t the validity of the testimonies of Plato’s successors, but it 
indeed confirms the existence of such a doctrine. So, now we can say 
that Plato is a dualist, and his first two principles are the One and the 
indefinite dyad, or matter. These two principles are contradictory and 
they are generating both superior beings and the physical world.  
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